

Set-theoretical Kripke-style semantics for three-valued paraconsistent logic^{*}

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【Abstract】 This paper deals with non-algebraic Kripke-style semantics for three-valued paraconsistent logic: set-theoretical Kripke-style semantics. We first recall two three-valued paraconsistent systems. We next introduce set-theoretical Kripke-style semantics for them.

【Key Words】 (Set-theoretical) Kripke-style semantics, algebraic semantics, three-valued logic, paraconsistent logic.

접수일자: 2014.10.14 심사 및 수정완료일: 2014.11.25 게재확정일: 2015.01.12

* This paper was supported by research funds of Chonbuk National University in 2014. I must thank the referees for their helpful comments.

1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to introduce non-algebraic Kripke-style semantics, i.e., set-theoretical Kripke-style semantics, for three-valued paraconsistent logic. For this, note that the present author introduced two kinds of (binary) Kripke-style semantics, i.e., algebraic and non-algebraic Kripke-style semantics, for logics with pseudo-Boolean (briefly, pB) and de Morgan (briefly, dM) negations in Yang(201+). But the author did not consider such semantics for logics with weak-Boolean (briefly, wB) negations. While paraconsistent logics have in general wB negations, which are dual of pB negations such as the intuitionistic and Dummett-Gödel logics H and G have, it is not clear whether such semantics work for three-valued paraconsistent systems.

As its answer, the author also introduced algebraic Kripke-style semantics for three-valued *paraconsistent* systems in Yang(2014). However, it was an open problem to show that the other kind of binary Kripke-style semantics works for three-valued paraconsistent logic. This paper resolves the remaining problem by introducing non-algebraic set-theoretic Kripke-style semantics for such systems.

The paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2, we introduce, more exactly recall the systems \mathbf{IUML}_3 (the \mathbf{IUML}_3 with a wB negation) and \mathbf{G}^{wB}_3 (the \mathbf{G}_3 with a wB negation in place of its pB negation) introduced in Yang(2014). Next, in Section 3, we introduce the other kind of binary relational Kripke-style semantics, non-algebraic set-theoretical Kripke-style semantics, for the above mentioned three-valued systems.

For ease, let us denote wB negation by $-$ and dM negation by \sim . Moreover, for convenience, we adopt notations and terminology similar to those in Dunn(2000), Metcalfe & Montagna(2007), Montagna & Sacchetti(2003; 2004), Yang(2012a; 2012b; 2012c) and assume reader familiarity with them (together with results found therein).

2. Three-valued paraconsistent systems

We base three-valued paraconsistent logics on a countable propositional language with formulas Fm built inductively as usual from a set of propositional variables VAR , binary connectives \rightarrow , $\&$, \wedge , \vee , and constants F , f , t , with a defined connective:

$$\text{df1. } A \leftrightarrow B := (A \rightarrow B) \wedge (B \rightarrow A).$$

We further define T and A_t as $F \rightarrow F$ and $A \wedge t$, respectively. We use the axiom systems to provide a consequence relation.

Definition 2.1 (Yang(2014))

(i) $IUML_3$ consists of the following axiom schemes and rules:

$$\text{df2. } -A := (T \rightarrow A) \rightarrow F$$

A1. $A \rightarrow A$ (self-implication, SI)

A2. $(A \wedge B) \rightarrow A$, $(A \wedge B) \rightarrow B$ (\wedge -elimination, \wedge -E)

A3. $((A \rightarrow B) \wedge (A \rightarrow C)) \rightarrow (A \rightarrow (B \wedge C))$ (\wedge -introduction, \wedge -I)

A4. $A \rightarrow (A \vee B)$, $B \rightarrow (A \vee B)$ (\vee -introduction, \vee -I)

- A5. $((A \rightarrow C) \wedge (B \rightarrow C)) \rightarrow ((A \vee B) \rightarrow C)$ (\vee -elimination, \vee -E)
- A6. $(A \ \& \ B) \rightarrow (B \ \& \ A)$ ($\&$ -commutativity, $\&$ -C)
- A7. $(A \ \& \ t) \leftrightarrow A$ (push and pop, PP)
- A8. $\mathbf{F} \rightarrow A$ (ex falsum quodlibet, EF)
- A9. $A \rightarrow \mathbf{T}$ (verum ex quolibet, VE)
- A10. $(A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow C)) \leftrightarrow ((A \ \& \ B) \rightarrow C)$ (residuation, RE)
- A11. $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow ((B \rightarrow C) \rightarrow (A \rightarrow C))$ (suffixing, SF)
- A12. $(A \rightarrow B)_t \vee (B \rightarrow A)_t$ (t -prelinearity, PL_t)
- A13. $\sim\sim A \rightarrow A$ (double negation elimination, DNE)
- A14. $(A \ \& \ A) \leftrightarrow A$ (idempotence, ID)
- A15. $t \leftrightarrow f$ (fixed-point, FP)
- A16. $A \rightarrow (\sim A \rightarrow A)$ (RM3(1))
- A17. $A \vee (A \rightarrow B)$ (RM3(2))
- A18. $\sim\sim A \rightarrow A$ (classical double negation, CIDN)
- A19. $A \rightarrow (B \vee \sim B)$ (triviality, TRI)
- A20. $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\sim B \rightarrow \sim A)$ (contraposition, CP')
- A21. $(A \wedge \sim B) \rightarrow \sim(A \rightarrow B)$ (-1)
- A22. $\sim A \rightarrow \sim A$ (-2)
- A23. $\sim(A \ \& \ B) \rightarrow ((A \wedge B) \rightarrow \sim(A \wedge \sim B))$ (-3)
- A24. $\sim\sim(A \ \& \ B) \rightarrow (\sim A \rightarrow B)$ (-4)
- A25. $((A \rightarrow B) \wedge \sim(A \rightarrow B)) \rightarrow (A \wedge \sim B)$ (IUML'3)
- $A \rightarrow B, A \vdash B$ (modus ponens, mp)
- $A, B \vdash A \wedge B$ (adjunction, adj)
- (ii) \mathbf{G}^{wB}_3 is A1 - A12, A14, A18, A19, (mp), (adj) plus
- A26. $A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow A)$ (weakening, W)
- A27. $\sim(A \wedge B) \leftrightarrow (\sim A \vee \sim B)$ (DM1')
- A28. $\sim(A \vee B) \leftrightarrow (\sim A \wedge \sim B)$ (DM2')

$$A29. ((A \rightarrow -(C \vee -C)) \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (((B \rightarrow A) \rightarrow B) \rightarrow B) \text{ (G3)}$$

$$A30. ((A \rightarrow B) \wedge -(A \rightarrow B)) \rightarrow (--A \wedge -B) \text{ (G3(1))}$$

$$A31. (--A \wedge -B) \rightarrow -(A \rightarrow B) \text{ (G3(2))}$$

For easy reference, we let L_{S_3} be the set of the three-valued systems introduced in Definition 2.1.

Definition 2.2 $L_{S_3} = \{\mathbf{IUML}_3, \mathbf{G}^{\text{WB}}_3\}$.

A *theory* is a set of formulas closed under consequence relation. A *proof* in a theory Γ over L_3 ($\in L_{S_3}$) is a sequence s of formulas such that each element of s is either an axiom of L_3 , a member of Γ , or is derivable from previous elements of s by means of a rule of L_3 . $\Gamma \vdash A$, more exactly $\Gamma \vdash_{L_3} A$, means that A is *provable* in Γ with respect to (w.r.t.) L_3 , i.e., there is an L_3 -proof of A in Γ . A theory Γ is *trivial* if $\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{F}$; otherwise, it is *non-trivial*.

The deduction theorems for L_3 are as follows:

Proposition 2.3 (Yang(2014)) Let Γ be a theory over L_3 and A, B be formulas.

$$(i) \Gamma \cup \{A\} \vdash_{\mathbf{IUML}_3} B \text{ iff } \Gamma \vdash_{\mathbf{IUML}_3} A \rightarrow B.$$

$$(ii) \Gamma \cup \{A\} \vdash_{\mathbf{G}^{\text{WB}}_3} B \text{ iff } \Gamma \vdash_{\mathbf{G}^{\text{WB}}_3} A \rightarrow B.$$


The following formulas can be proved straightforwardly.

Proposition 2.4 (Yang(2014))(i) L_3 ($\in L_{S_3}$) proves:(1) $(A \ \& \ (B \ \& \ C)) \rightarrow ((A \ \& \ B) \ \& \ C)$ (associativity, AS)(2) $(A \rightarrow B) \vee (B \rightarrow A)$ (prelinearity, PL)(3) $A \vee \neg A$ (excluded middle, EM)(ii) \mathbf{IUML}_3 proves:(1) $\sim\sim A \leftrightarrow A$ (double negation, DN)(iii) \mathbf{G}^{WB}_3 proves (CP) and:(1) $\mathbf{t} \leftrightarrow \mathbf{T}$ (INT).

3. Set-theoretical Kripke-style semantics

3.1. Semantics

Here, we consider non-algebraic set-theoretical and binary relational Kripke-style semantics for L_3 . Let us regard an evaluation to be a function from sentences to non-empty sets of two truth values, including the set having both truth values to account for overdetermination. We regard a three-valued matrix as a lattice and call it the *lattice* $\mathfrak{3}_B$; we denote each set of value(s) $\{0\}$, $\{1\}$, and $\{0, 1\}$ by F, T, and B, respectively (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: The lattice $\mathfrak{3}_B$

Each matrix for \sim , $-$, \wedge , \vee , and \rightarrow can be defined as in Table 1 (+ indicates the designated value(s)).¹⁾

-	
T+	F
B	T
F	T

\sim	
T+	F
B+	T
F	T

\wedge	T	B	F
T+	T	B	F
B(+)	B	B	F
F	F	F	F

\vee	T	B	F
T+	T	T	T
B(+)	T	B	B
F	T	B	F

\rightarrow_{G3}	T	B	F
T+	T	B	F
B	T	T	F
F	T	T	T

\rightarrow_{RM3}	T	B	F
T+	T	F	F
B+	T	B	F
F	T	T	T

Table 1: Three-valued matrices for evaluations of L_3

Note that, in Table 1, we take \rightarrow_{G3} and \rightarrow_{RM3} for \mathbf{G}^{wB}_3 and \mathbf{IUML}_3^- , respectively.

Next, as in Dunn(2000), let us define evaluations. An *evaluation* into $\mathbf{3}_B$ is a function v from sentences into $\mathbf{3}_B$ such that $v(-A) =$

¹⁾ We do not have to introduce the matrix for $\&$ because $\&$ is \wedge in \mathbf{G}^{wB}_3 , and definable in \mathbf{IUML}_3^- using \sim and \rightarrow connectives. Note that, while the matrices for \mathbf{G}^{wB}_3 have one designated element T, the matrices for \mathbf{IUML}_3^- have the two T, B. By (+), we ambiguously express these in the matrices for \wedge and \vee .

$\neg v(A)$, $v(\sim A) = \sim v(A)$, $v(A \wedge B) = v(A) \wedge v(B)$, $v(A \vee B) = v(A) \vee v(B)$, and $v(A \rightarrow B) = v(A) \rightarrow v(B)$. As the labeling of Figure 1 reveals, we can view $\mathfrak{3}_B$ as consisting of subsets of the usual two truth values. Thus, equivalently, an evaluation can be regarded as a map v from sentences into the powerset of $\{1, 0\}$ (see below). For a *total evaluation*, we always have at least one of $0, 1 \in v(A)$. We write $\Vdash_1^v A$ for $1 \in v(A)$ and $\Vdash_0^v A$ for $0 \in v(A)$. Like the two-valued matrix for classical logic CL, we call a matrix *characteristic* for a calculus L when a formula A is provable if it assumes a designated value for every assignment of values to its variables, i.e., if L is weak complete w.r.t. the matrix (see e.g. Dunn(2000) and Dunn & Hardegree(2001)).

Definition 3.1 (Dunn(2000)) A *binary relational Kripke frame* (briefly a *frame*) is a structure $\mathbf{S} = (U, \zeta, \sqsubseteq)$, where $\zeta \in U$ and \sqsubseteq is a partial order (p.o.) on U }

As X in Section 3, we regard U as a set of nodes. Then, ζ is the base state of information, and it further does not hurt to require that ζ be the least element of U under \sqsubseteq . By Σ , we denote the class of all frames. For L_3 , we need to consider frames where \sqsubseteq is connected in the sense that, for any $\alpha, \beta \in U$, either $\alpha \sqsubseteq \beta$ or $\beta \sqsubseteq \alpha$. A *linear order* (l.o.) is a connected partial order. Then a *linear frame* is a structure $\mathbf{S} = (U, \zeta, \sqsubseteq)$, where $\zeta \in U$ and \sqsubseteq is an l.o. on U .

We assume that there are denumerably many atomic sentences, and that the class of formulas Fm is defined inductively from these

in the usual manner, utilizing the connectives \neg , \sim , \wedge , \vee , and \rightarrow . A (parameterized) L_3 -*evaluation* on a linear frame \mathbf{S} is a function $v(A, \alpha)$ from $Fm \times U$ into $\mathbf{3}_B$ subject to the conditions below. We denote the set of these evaluations as \mathbf{Val}_{L_3} , and we write $\alpha \Vdash_1^v A$ for 1 in $v(A, \alpha)$ and $\alpha \Vdash_0^v A$ for 0 in $v(A, \alpha)$. In context, we often leave the superscript v implicit.

(Atomic Hereditary Conditions (AHC)) for any atomic sentence p ,
 (HC₁) $\alpha \Vdash_1^v p$ and $\alpha \sqsubseteq \beta \Rightarrow \beta \Vdash_1^v p$;
 (HC₀) $\alpha \Vdash_0^v p$ and $\alpha \sqsubseteq \beta \Rightarrow \beta \Vdash_0^v p$.

The truth and falsity conditions for propositional constants \mathbf{t} , \mathbf{f} , \mathbf{T} , \mathbf{F} , and compound sentences are then given by the following clauses:

(tf₁) $\alpha \Vdash_1 \mathbf{t} \Leftrightarrow \alpha \Vdash_1 \mathbf{f}$;
 (tf₀) $\alpha \Vdash_0 \mathbf{t} \Leftrightarrow \alpha \Vdash_0 \mathbf{f}$;
 (\top ₁) $\alpha \Vdash_1 \mathbf{T}$ always;
 (\top ₀) $\alpha \Vdash_0 \mathbf{T}$ never;
 (\perp ₁) $\alpha \Vdash_1 \mathbf{F}$ never;
 (\perp ₀) $\alpha \Vdash_0 \mathbf{F}$ always;
 (-₁) $\alpha \Vdash_1 \neg A \Leftrightarrow \alpha \Vdash_0 A$;
 (-₀) $\alpha \Vdash_0 \neg A \Leftrightarrow \alpha \not\Vdash_0 A$;
 (\sim ₁) $\alpha \Vdash_1 \sim A \Leftrightarrow \alpha \Vdash_0 A$;
 (\sim ₀) $\alpha \Vdash_0 \sim A \Leftrightarrow \alpha \Vdash_1 A$;
 (\wedge ₁) $\alpha \Vdash_1 A \wedge B \Leftrightarrow \alpha \Vdash_1 A$ and $\alpha \Vdash_1 B$;
 (\wedge ₀) $\alpha \Vdash_0 A \wedge B \Leftrightarrow \alpha \Vdash_0 A$ or $\alpha \Vdash_0 B$;
 (\vee ₁) $\alpha \Vdash_1 A \vee B \Leftrightarrow \alpha \Vdash_1 A$ or $\alpha \Vdash_1 B$;

- $(\vee_0) \alpha \Vdash_0 A \vee B \Leftrightarrow \alpha \Vdash_0 A \text{ and } \alpha \Vdash_0 B;$
 $(\rightarrow_1) \alpha \Vdash_1 A \rightarrow B \Leftrightarrow$ (i) for all $\beta \sqsupseteq \alpha$, $(\beta \Vdash_1 A \Rightarrow \beta \Vdash_1 B)$,
and
(ii) for all $\beta \sqsupseteq \alpha$, $(\beta \Vdash_0 B \Rightarrow \beta \Vdash_0 A);$
 $(\rightarrow_{0G3}) \alpha \Vdash_0 A \rightarrow B \Leftrightarrow$ (i) $\alpha \Vdash_0 \neg A$, i.e., for all $\beta \sqsupseteq \alpha$, $\beta \not\Vdash_0$
 A , and $\alpha \Vdash_0 B$, or
(ii) $\alpha \not\Vdash_1 A \rightarrow B;$
 $(\rightarrow_{0RM3}) \alpha \Vdash_0 A \rightarrow B \Leftrightarrow$ (i) $\alpha \Vdash_1 A$ and $\alpha \Vdash_0 B$, or
(ii) $\alpha \not\Vdash_1 A \rightarrow B.$

Note that, w.r.t. the truth condition of implication, we take (\rightarrow_1) for L_3 , but w.r.t. the falsity condition of implication, we take (\rightarrow_{0G3}) and (\rightarrow_{0RM3}) for \mathbf{G}^{WB}_3 and \mathbf{IUML}_3 , respectively. More exactly, the \mathbf{G}^{WB}_3 -evaluation has the conditions (\neg_1) , (\neg_0) , (\wedge_1) , (\wedge_0) , (\vee_1) , (\vee_0) , (\rightarrow_1) , and (\rightarrow_{0G3}) ; the \mathbf{IUML}_3 -evaluation has the conditions (tf_1) , (tf_0) , (\top_1) , (\top_0) , (\perp_1) , (\perp_0) , (\neg_1) , (\neg_0) , (\sim_1) , (\sim_0) , (\wedge_1) , (\wedge_0) , (\vee_1) , (\vee_0) , (\rightarrow_1) , and (\rightarrow_{0RM3}) .

A sentence A is L_3 -valid in a frame $\mathbf{S} = (U, \zeta, \sqsubseteq)$ iff, for all v in \mathbf{Val}_{L_3} , $\zeta \Vdash_1^v A$. Let Θ be the class of linear frames. A sentence A is L_3 -valid, in symbols $\models_{L_3} A$, iff, for all $\mathbf{S} \in \Theta$, A is L_3 -valid in \mathbf{S} .

Given a class of $\models \mathbf{M}_{L_3}$ for L_3 , we can define (simple truth preserving, corresponding to \models_1 .) consequence as follows:

Definition 3.2 $\Gamma \models_{L_3} A$ iff, for all $\models \mathcal{M} = (U, \zeta, \sqsubseteq, v) \in \mathbf{M}_{L_3}$, if $\zeta \Vdash_1^v B$ for all $B \in \Gamma$, then $\zeta \Vdash_1^v A$.)

3.2. Soundness and completeness for L_3

First we note the following lemma, which is useful for the verification of each instance of the axiom schemes in Proposition 3.4 below:

- Lemma 3.3** (Hereditary Lemma) For any sentence A ,
- (i) if $\alpha \Vdash_1^v A$ and $\alpha \sqsubseteq \beta$, then $\beta \Vdash_1^v A$, and
 - (ii) if $\alpha \Vdash_0^v A$ and $\alpha \sqsubseteq \beta$, then $\beta \Vdash_0^v A$.

Proof: See Hereditary Lemma in Dunn(1976) and Lemmas 1 and 5 in Yang(2012a). \square

Proposition 3.4 (Soundness) If $\vdash_{L_3} A$, then $\models_{L_3} A$.

Proof: The rules of L_3 are (mp) and (adj). Both of these obviously preserve truth, i.e., L_3 -validity. (For the former, look at (\rightarrow_1) and recall that \sqsubseteq is reflexive; for the latter, look at (\wedge_1) .) Thus, the proof reduces to verification of axioms for L_3 . We verify A18 and A30 as examples.

For A18, we must show that (i) $\alpha \Vdash_1 \neg\neg A$ only if $\alpha \Vdash_1 A$ and (ii) $\alpha \Vdash_0 A$ only if $\alpha \Vdash_0 \neg\neg A$. For (i), let $\alpha \Vdash_1 \neg\neg A$. By $(-_1)$ and $(-_0)$, we have $\alpha \Vdash_1 \neg\neg A$ iff $\alpha \Vdash_0 \neg A$ iff $\alpha \not\Vdash_0 A$. Then, since the evaluation is total, we obtain $\alpha \Vdash_1 A$. The proof for (ii) is analogous.

For A30, we must show that (i) $\alpha \Vdash_1 (A \rightarrow B) \wedge \neg(A \rightarrow B)$ only if $\alpha \Vdash_1 \neg\neg A \wedge \neg B$ and (ii) $\alpha \Vdash_0 \neg\neg A \wedge \neg B$ only if $\alpha \Vdash_0 (A \rightarrow B) \wedge \neg(A \rightarrow B)$. For (i), let $\alpha \Vdash_1 (A \rightarrow B) \wedge \neg(A \rightarrow B)$. By

(\wedge_1) , we have $\alpha \Vdash_1 A \rightarrow B$ and $\alpha \Vdash_1 \neg(A \rightarrow B)$. By (\neg_1) and (\rightarrow_{0G3}) , we have $\alpha \Vdash_1 \neg(A \rightarrow B)$ iff $\alpha \Vdash_0 A \rightarrow B$ iff $\alpha \Vdash_0 \neg A$ and $\alpha \Vdash_0 B$ iff $\alpha \Vdash_1 \neg\neg A$ and $\alpha \Vdash_1 \neg B$. Therefore, by (\wedge_1) , we have $\alpha \Vdash_1 \neg\neg A \wedge \neg B$. For (ii), let $\alpha \Vdash_0 \neg\neg A \wedge \neg B$. By (\wedge_0) and (\neg_0) , we have $\alpha \Vdash_0 \neg\neg A \wedge \neg B$ iff $\alpha \Vdash_0 \neg\neg A$ or $\alpha \Vdash_0 \neg B$ iff $\alpha \not\Vdash_0 \neg A$ or $\alpha \not\Vdash_0 B$. Then, by (\rightarrow_{0G3}) and (\neg_0) , we further have $\alpha \not\Vdash_0 \neg A$ or $\alpha \not\Vdash_0 B$ iff $\alpha \not\Vdash_0 A \rightarrow B$ iff $\alpha \Vdash_0 \neg(A \rightarrow B)$. Then, since $\alpha \Vdash_0 (A \rightarrow B) \wedge \neg(A \rightarrow B)$ iff $\alpha \Vdash_0 (A \rightarrow B)$ or $\alpha \Vdash_0 \neg(A \rightarrow B)$ by (\wedge_0) , we have $\alpha \Vdash_0 (A \rightarrow B) \wedge \neg(A \rightarrow B)$.

The verification of other axiom schemes for L_3 is left to the reader. \square

We give completeness results for L_3 by using the well-known Henkin-style proofs for modal logic, but with prime theories in place of maximal theories. We call a theory Γ *prime* if, for each pair A, B of formulas such that $\Gamma \vdash A \vee B$, $\Gamma \vdash A$ or $\Gamma \vdash B$. By an L_3 -*theory*, we mean a theory Γ closed under rules of L_3 . As in relevance logic, by a *regular* L_3 -theory, we mean an L_3 -theory containing all of the theorems of L_3 . Since we have no use of irregular theories, from now on, by an L_3 -theory, we henceforth mean a regular L_3 -theory.

Moreover, where Γ is a prime L_3 -theory, we define the *canonical L_3 frame* determined by Γ to be a structure $\mathbf{S} = (U_{\text{can}}, \zeta_{\text{can}}, \sqsubseteq_{\text{can}})$, where ζ_{can} is the Γ , U_{can} is the set of prime L_3 theories extending ζ_{can} , and \sqsubseteq_{can} is \subseteq restricted to U_{can} . Note that the base ζ_{can} is constructed as the prime L_3 -theory that excludes nontheorems of L_3 , i.e., excludes A such that $\text{not } \vdash_{L_3} A$. The partial orderedness and

the linear orderedness of the canonical L_3 frame depend on \subseteq restricted on U_{can} . Then, first, the following is obvious.

Proposition 3.5 The canonical L_3 frame is linearly ordered.

Proof: By Proposition 26 in Dunn(2000). \square

Next, we define a canonical evaluation as follows:

- (1) $1 \in v_{\text{can}}(A, \alpha) \Leftrightarrow A \in \alpha$;
- (2) $0 \in v_{\text{can}}(A, \alpha) \Leftrightarrow \neg A$ ($\sim A$ resp) $\in \alpha$.

This definition allows us to state the following lemma.

Lemma 3.6 (Canonical Evaluation Lemma) v_{can} is an evaluation.

Proof: The Hereditary Conditions (HC₁) and (HC₀) are obvious. Thus, we show that the canonical evaluation v_{can} satisfies the truth and falsity conditions above. We prove here the truth and falsity conditions (-₁) and (-₀) and the falsity condition of implication (\rightarrow 0G3)

For (-₁), we must show

$$\alpha \Vdash^{v_{\text{can}}_1} \neg A \text{ iff } \alpha \Vdash^{v_{\text{can}}_0} A.$$

By (1) and (2), we have $\alpha \Vdash^{v_{\text{can}}_1} \neg A$ iff $\neg A \in \alpha$ iff $\alpha \Vdash^{v_{\text{can}}_0} A$.

For (-₀), we must show

$$\alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_0 \neg A \text{ iff } \alpha \not\Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_0 A.$$

By (2), we have $\alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_0 \neg A$ iff $\neg\neg A \in \alpha$. Then, since $\neg B$ for any formula B has boolean properties, we have $\neg\neg B \in \alpha$ iff $\neg B \notin \alpha$. Therefore, by (2), we have $\neg\neg A \in \alpha$ iff $\neg A \notin \alpha$ iff $\alpha \not\Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_0 A$.

For (\rightarrow_{0G3}) , we must show

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_0 A \rightarrow B \text{ iff (i) } & \alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_1 \neg\neg A \text{ and } \alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_0 B, \text{ or} \\ & \text{(ii) } \alpha \not\Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_1 A \rightarrow B. \end{aligned}$$

For the left-to-right direction, let $\alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_0 A \rightarrow B$. By (1) and (2), we have $\alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_0 A \rightarrow B$ iff $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in \alpha$ iff $\alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_1 \neg(A \rightarrow B)$. If $A \rightarrow B \in \alpha$, we obtain $\neg\neg A \wedge \neg B \in \alpha$ using A30. Therefore, by (1) and (2), we obtain $\alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_1 \neg\neg A$ and $\alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_0 B$. If $A \rightarrow B \notin \alpha$, we have $\alpha \not\Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_1 A \rightarrow B$. For the right-to-left direction, we first assume $\alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_1 \neg\neg A$ and $\alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_0 B$. Then, using (1), (2), and A31, we can obtain $\alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_0 A \rightarrow B$. Let $\alpha \not\Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_1 A \rightarrow B$. (EM) and primeness ensures $\alpha \Vdash^{\text{Vcan}}_0 A \rightarrow B$. \square

Let us call a model $\mathcal{M}, = (U, \zeta, \sqsubseteq, \nu)$, for L_3 , an L_3 model. Then, by Lemma 3.6, the canonically defined $(U_{\text{can}}, \zeta_{\text{can}}, \sqsubseteq_{\text{can}}, \nu_{\text{can}})$ is an L_3 model. Thus, since, by construction, ζ_{can} excludes our chosen nontheorem A , and the canonical definition of \models agrees with membership, we can state that, for each nontheorem A of L_3 , there is an L_3 model in which A is not $\zeta_{\text{can}} \models A$. It gives us the weak completeness of L_3 as follows.

Theorem 3.7 (Weak completeness) If $\models_{L_3} A$, then $\vdash_{L_3} A$.

Next, we prove the strong completeness of L_3 . As for \mathbf{R}^+ in Anderson et al.(1992), we define A to be an L_3 *consequence* of a theory Γ iff for every L_3 model, whenever $\alpha \models B$ for every $B \in \Gamma$, $\alpha \models A$, for all $\alpha \in U$. We say that A is L_3 *deducible* from Γ iff A is in every L_3 -theory containing Γ . Where Δ is a set of formulas not necessarily a theory, $\Delta \vdash A$ can be thought of as saying that A is deducible from the axioms Δ . The set of $\{A: \Delta \vdash A\}$ is intuitively the smallest theory containing the axioms Δ , and we shall label it as $Th(\Delta)$. Then,

Proposition 3.8 Let Γ be a theory over L_3 . If $\Gamma \not\vdash_{L_3} A$, then there is a prime theory Γ' such that $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma'$ and $A \notin \Gamma'$.

Proof: We prove the case of \mathbf{IUML}_3 as an example. Let L_3 be \mathbf{IUML}_3 . Take an enumeration $\{A_n: n \in \omega\}$ of the well-formed formulas of L_3 . We define a sequence of sets by induction as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \Gamma_0 &= \{A': \Gamma \vdash_{L_3} A'\}. \\ \Gamma_{i+1} &= \text{Th}(\Gamma_i \cup \{A_{i+1}\}) \quad \text{if } \Gamma_i, A_{i+1} \not\vdash_{L_3} A, \\ &\Gamma_i \quad \text{otherwise.} \end{aligned}$$

Let Γ' be the union of all these Γ_n 's. The primeness of Γ' can be proved using the deduction theorem for \mathbf{IUML}_3 , i.e., Proposition 2.3 (i), along the usual lines. \square

Thus, using Lemma 3.6 and Proposition 3.8, we can show strong completeness of L_3 as follows.

Theorem 3.9 (Strong completeness) Let Γ be a theory over L_3 . If $\Gamma \models_{L_3} A$, then $\Gamma \vdash_{L_3} A$.

4. Concluding remark

Yang investigated algebraic Kripke-style semantics for three-valued paraconsistent systems in Yang(2014). We further investigated non-algebraic set-theoretical Kripke-style semantics for such systems. But three-valued paraconsistent system having algebraic Kripke-style semantics but not set-theoretical Kripke-style semantics, and vice versa, have not yet been studied. This is a problem left in this paper.

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3차 초일관 논리를 위한 집합-이론적 크립키형 의미론

양은석

이 글에서 우리는 3차 초일관 논리를 위한 비대수적 집합-이론적 크립키형 의미론을 다룬다. 이를 위하여 먼저 두 3차 체계를 소개한다. 그리고 그 다음에 이에 상응하는 집합-이론적 크립키형 의미론을 소개한다.

주요어: (집합-이론적) 크립키형 의미론, 대수적 의미론, 3차 논리, 초일관 논리