On Nominalist Paraphrase* †

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【Abstract】This paper is about the problems that Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment creates for Nominalists. Quine’s clear criterion of ontological commitment, summarized as “to be is to be the value of a variable”, means that when we accept a sentence to be true, we are committed to the existence of things that must exist for the sentence to be true. The criterion causes problems for Nominalists. According to Quine’s criterion, Nominalists who consider “Humility is a virtue” as true should accept the existence of the property, humility. However, Nominalists are reluctant to accept that properties such as humility exist, although they wish to accept what is meant by “humility is a virtue”. The way out of this predicament is presenting a paraphrase which delivers what Nominalists wanted to say through the original sentence without ontological commitment to the property. Several attempts were made to paraphrase such sentences, only to fail. In this paper, successful paraphrases will be presented to cope with previously discussed difficulties. Beforehand, several issues involved in the Quine’s criterion will be clarified. Also, Lewis’s critical objection that we should give up the business of paraphrase will be discussed.

【Key Words】Ontological commitment, Property, Nominalists, Paraphrase, Lewis

* I deeply thank to the commentators for their valuable advice.
I. Introduction

This paper is about the problems that Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment creates for Nominalists, and a solution to those problems. By Nominalists, I mean those who repudiate the existence of *sui generis* properties.\(^1\)

Quine’s clear criterion of ontological commitment, summarized as “to be is to be the value of a variable”, means that when we accept a sentence to be true, we are committed to the existence of things that must exist for the sentence to be true. This criterion involves several topics to be clarified. Is there only one way of quantification for a given sentence? Do we need to resort to a semantic theory to determine ontological commitment? When we talk about ontological commitment, is it of people or of sentences? Clarifying these issues is necessary to facilitate the investigation of the subsequent topics.

The criterion causes problems. Sometimes we are pressed to accept what we do not want to believe in. For example, we might want to regard “the average man has 2.4 children” to be true, but might not want to accept the existence of the queer entity, the average man, which serves as the value of the variable here. The way out of this predicament is presenting a paraphrase which delivers what we wanted to say through the original sentence. Thus, if we say “The number of children divided by the number of men is 2.4”, we can say what we wanted without

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\(^1\) My argument is to be confined to the existence of properties only. Other abstract entities such as numbers will not be discussed.
an ontological burden of queer entities. Misunderstanding the nature of paraphrase has caused several worries about paraphrase. Those concerns will be dissolved by clarifying the nature of paraphrase.

Unfortunately, paraphrase was never easy for Nominalists. They are reluctant to accept that properties such as humility exist, but wish to accept what is meant by “humility is a virtue”. Several attempts were made to paraphrase such sentences, only to fail. In this paper, successful paraphrases will be presented to cope with previously discussed difficulties. Also, Lewis’s critical objection that we should give up the business of paraphrase will be discussed.

II. Clarification of Ontological Commitment and the Nature of Paraphrase

Quine says that the only way we can involve ourselves in ontological commitment is by use of bound variables.2) We should note that this criterion is neutral between particulars and properties. The impartiality of the criterion should not be confused with Quine’s Nominalistic position. However much Quine is biased against the existence of properties, the criterion itself does not show preference about what variables range over. In fact, Quine makes it clear that properties can be quantified over by saying:

2) Quine (1953), p. 12
We can very easily involve ourselves in ontological commitments by saying, for example, that there is something (bound variable) which red houses and sunsets have in common.\(^3\)

As the criterion itself does not indicate which element in a sentence to quantify over, the decision is left to every individual. Perhaps one might think semantic theories will help our decisions. However, these theories do not help us. They only confirm that the call is in our hands, as we can give one sentence two different, but equally competent semantic analyses at the same time: one way to quantify into name position, the other way into predicate position. Take “a is F”, for example. It could be analysed as follows, as Devitt insists\(^4\):

\[(a) \text{‘a is F’ is true iff there exists an } x \text{ such that ‘a’ designates } x \text{ and ‘F’ applies to } x.\]

In this case, ‘a is F’ is committed only to what ‘a’ designate. However, as Oliver showed\(^5\), “a is F” can also be analysed into:

\[(b) \text{‘a is F’ is true iff there exists a } \phi \text{ such that ‘is } F \text{’ designates } \phi \text{ and ‘a’ falls under } \phi.\]

According to this schema, ‘a is F’ is committed to F-ness. However, it is difficult to find reasons for (a) to be the only

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\(^3\) Quine (1953), p. 12  
\(^4\) Devitt (1980), p. 96  
\(^5\) Oliver (1996), p. 62
right analysis. As Oliver says, "If it was all right to have a primitive semantic relation, applies to;⋅⋅⋅then it ought to be all right to have, falls under" Some might reply that we need a referent for 'a' in 'a is F' to infer 'there is some x such that x is F', but we may equally infer 'there is some φ such that a is φ' from 'a is F', as we infer 'there is some property which John has' from 'John is tall'. It seems to be difficult to find reasons to prioritize (a) over (b).

The aforementioned considerations suggest that linking a semantic theory to ontological commitment is a bad idea. As Devitt regrets later, we need not look to semantic theories to determine ontological commitment, since ontological commitment is nothing more than saying that there is something. No theory is needed to understand this ordinary comment.

Nevertheless, that semantic theories do not provide guidance, leaving us a complete freedom of choice between quantification over particulars and properties, does not mean that we lack proper direction on our decisions. Indeed, we have a strong motivation to quantify over particulars: that particulars, e.g. my hand, exist is a Moorean fact, such an evident fact that even philosophers may not deny. Note that we need not quantify into both name and predicate position of a true sentence. It would be against Occam's razor to choose both, committing to both entities, if choosing one position is enough for a sentence to be true. In that case, our choice is clear; it is much more sensible to commit

\[6)\] Oliver (1996), p. 62

\[7)\] Devitt (forthcoming), p. 21
to particulars than to properties. While there are heated disputes about existence of properties, there are few about particulars, if any.

This consideration leads us to another issue. I was free to choose between quantification over particulars and properties. By choosing particulars, I committed myself to a certain kind of ontology. Even though some sentences such as ‘there is a’ or ‘a exists’ determine by themselves to which they commit, most sentences remain neutral about the position we must quantify into. This implies what really matter here is commitment of people, not of sentences. Take ‘a is F’ for example. As mentioned above, this sentence is open to two possibilities of quantification, (a) and (b). The sentence being committed to x or φ is of little interest to us. Quine choosing (a) is not interesting either. However, if Quine chooses (b), it immediately attracts our attention. What interests us is not commitment of sentences, but of people.

Unfortunately, we are not entirely free to choose commitments. Sometimes, especially for Nominalists, there are problems. Nominalists want to accept what is meant by “humility is a virtue”. However, quantification either into name or predicate position causes worries for the Nominalists, since they must commit to properties in both cases.

Here paraphrase plays its role. If Nominalists paraphrase the sentence into “humble persons are virtuous”\(^8\), then Nominalists have a way out, saying what they want without commitment to properties. The paraphrase allows people different possibilities of

\(^8\) However, this paraphrase is wrong for several reasons to be discussed later.
commitment. Those who state the original sentence, “humility is a virtue” are committed to the existence of humility, while those who choose to state the paraphrased one, “humble persons are virtuous”, are committed to the existence of persons. The different possibilities imply that the paraphrase is not synonymous with the original sentence. As Devitt says, if the sentences were synonymous, they would not have very different commitments.⁹)

This enlightens the nature of paraphrase. Paraphrase is not translation of original sentences¹⁰); rather it is constructing true sentences that replace the false ones. Strictly speaking, “humility is a virtue” is false to Nominalists¹¹) as much as “the average man has 2.4 children” is, as long as they say something strange exists. However, even though they are false, Nominalists need to express the truth underlying the false sentences. Otherwise, they remain in excessive silence. To use an analogy, if one claims that “the Sun rises in the east” is false, then one had better present “the Earth revolves the Sun in the east direction” when needed. Presenting true sentences does not imply that we must do away with all the false sentences, because false sentences have pragmatic value in our life. We would not be able to compose poems without false sentences.

This observation dissolves concerns about paraphrase. Lewis

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⁹) Devitt (forthcoming), p. 25
¹⁰) Translation presupposes that the original sentence and the one translated from the original are synonymous. However, as demonstrated above, the original sentence and the paraphrased one are not synonymous since what the two sentences claim to exit are very different.
¹¹) Of course, the sentence is false only to Nominalists. The sentence is true to those who accept the existence of sui generis property, humility.
worries that the piecemeal ways of paraphrases threaten our systematic semantics, thereby repudiating paraphrase. If translation of sentences to which a semantic is to be applied is not systematic but piecemeal, then it causes problems. However, as discussed, paraphrase is not translation. If paraphrasing is just constructing new sentences according to rules of semantics and syntax, it poses no threat to semantics. Furthermore, Lewis had better participate in the business of paraphrase, for he as well is not free from the burden of the task. How would he accept the truth of “the average man has 2.4 children” without paraphrase? It would be wiser to paraphrase the sentence than to accept the existence of the average man or 2.4 children.

Alston’s (1958) argument against paraphrase is that there is no guarantee that the paraphrased sentences reveal the real commitment of the original sentences. Suppose that S is committed to e and its paraphrase S’ is not committed to e. The purpose of S’ is to show that the commitment of S to e is merely apparent. However, as Alston asks, why must we believe that it is S and not S’ that deceives us? The answer to Alston is that neither deceives us.\(^{12}\) The two sentences are distinct, and they have their own real commitments. Alston’s question assumes that only one is real of the two inherently connected sentences. However that is not the assumption we need to take, considering the clear distinction between two sentences.

The real problem for Nominalists is that presenting paraphrase is sometimes very difficult. There are many sentences that press

\(^{12}\) Devitt (forthcoming), p. 25
Nominalists to commit to properties.

III. Predicament of Nominalists and the Solution

There are three sorts of subsentential constructions that can be claimed to harbour ontological commitment to properties: predicates such as “...is red” in “the house is red”; abstract singular terms such as “humility” in “humility is a virtue”; property-quantifiers occurring in sentences like, “There are physical properties”. Quine offers opinions on these three sorts, which have invited many criticisms. The debates on three kinds deserve separate examination.

1. Predicates in General

Quine says that we need not postulate the existence of a property, redness, to accept e.g. “the house is red” to be true. He says:

The word ‘red’ or ‘red object’ is true of each of sundry individual entities which are red houses, red roses... That the hoses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible...13)

Armstrong criticizes Quine for being a philosophical ostrich who evades a compulsory question by not giving a proper account. The question Armstrong considers as compulsory is the One Over Many Problem. The problem is about ‘how numerically different particulars can nevertheless be identical in nature, all be

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13) Quine (1953), p. 10
of the same “type”. Armstrong regards sameness of type as a Moorean fact.\(^\text{14}\) Instead of explaining how roses and sunsets can be all red, Armstrong says, Quine just regards their being red as ultimate and irreducible, saying that their common form ‘a is F’ is perfectly all right as it is.

Thus, Armstrong takes Quine as an ostrich because Quine lacks further explanation of ‘a is F’.\(^\text{15}\) But this accusation is unreasonable. Quine deserves to be called an ostrich only when he ignores the compulsory question. However, analysing ‘a is F’ and accounting for sameness of type, the compulsory question, are two distinct matters. As Lewis indicates, a proper formulation of the problem of sameness of type is: a and b are of the same type (or, have a common property)\(^\text{16}\) It is different from ‘a is F’, analysing which is the analysis of predicates in general. For that reason, Armstrong is mistaken to consider Quine as an ostrich, unless Armstrong proves the necessary connection between the two problems.

Does Quine, then, offer an account of the compulsory question? Yes. As seen above, Quine’s would say that it is ultimate that roses and sunsets are similar. As Lewis adds, taking a purported fact as primitive is a way of giving an account. Not every account is an analysis.\(^\text{17}\) This is correct as every analysis has to

\(^{14}\) Armstrong (1978), p. 41

\(^{15}\) It is not clear exactly what kind of explanation Armstrong demands. Considering his analysis of ‘is F’ is ‘has F-ness’, I take it that Armstrong is requesting a conceptual analysis of predication.

\(^{16}\) Lewis (1983), pp. 356-358

\(^{17}\) Lewis (1983), pp. 352-354
end at some point.

Therefore, a desirable way to question the adequacy of Quine’s position is to present an advanced and better account. One can demonstrate how the sameness of type and ‘a is F’ can be further analysed. It would be more interesting if the analysis involves the ontological commitment of properties, as the issue discussed here is whether ‘a is F’ harbours such commitment. Armstrong’s answer will satisfy our curiosity. Armstrong insists that ‘a is F’ is to be analysed into ‘a has F-ness’.

An immediate response to this account would be: how does it explain ‘a is F’? It just made the *analysandum* more complicated by introducing a two-place predicate ‘has’. Also, as Devitt indicates, “if there is a problem about a being F, then there is at least an equal problems about a having F-ness”\(^{19}\) Worse, how is ‘a has F-ness’ to be explained further? Armstrong first needs to explain the nature of the new predicate ‘has’. One way to explain is taking ‘has’ as corresponding to a *relation*, which is a property. Then we need a new relation of instantiation that holds between ‘has’ and the other elements. Other new relations will be invited infinitely for the same reason. Armstrong might want to regard *a* and *F-ness* as non-relational, but it is difficult to understand why ‘has’ is non-relational. For these reasons, Armstrong’s analysis does not deserve to be a better account than Quine’s, implying the rejection of a possibility of property-commitment of ‘a is F’.

\(^{18}\) Likewise, a resembles b iff a and b have the same properties. Armstrong (1978, p. 96)

\(^{19}\) Devitt (1980), pp. 437-438
However, even though Armstrong’s analysis is implausible, there is another way to consider the ontological commitment of ‘a is F’ to a property F-ness. We can infer (c)“John has a virtue” from “John is honest”. As John’s virtue is honesty, it is reasonable to derive (d)“John has honesty”. (c) features a property-quantifier, and (d) features an abstract singular term. If (c) and (d) are implied in “John is honest”, then it is right to say that “John is honest” is committed to the property, honesty. Therefore, whether ‘a is F’ has ontological commitment to properties seems to depend on the commitment of the other two kinds of expressions.

Quine presented two strategies to deal with the two kinds of troublesome sentences. First, one can offer paraphrases of those sentences. If the paraphrases do not feature abstract singular terms or property-quantifiers, then one frees himself from the ontological burden. For example, Quine suggests that “humility is a virtue” can be paraphrased as “humble persons are virtuous”.

Second, even if the troublesome sentences are taken at face value, we can regard what the sentences refer to or quantify over are not properties, but more respectable entities such as sets or open sentences. The validity of the second strategy hinges on the validity of the first strategy. As Oliver says, if we cannot successfully paraphrase “red is a colour”, then we must accept that ‘red’ is a genuine singular term, and that it stands neither for a set nor an open sentence. Once we admit ‘red’ as a genuine singular term, then the sentence “something is a colour”,

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20) Quine (1960), p. 122
which is inferred from “red is a colour”, cannot feature a quantifier ranging over sets or open sentences.\textsuperscript{21}) Therefore, the possibility of successful paraphrase of abstract singular terms is crucial, to which I will now turn.

2. Abstract Singular Terms

The possibility of paraphrase was threatened by the following sentences presented by Armstrong (1)\textsuperscript{22), Pap (2-3)\textsuperscript{23), and Jackson (2-3)\textsuperscript{24):}

(1) Humility is a virtue.
(2) Red is a colour.
(3) Red resembles pink more than it resembles blue.

After demonstrating the difficulties of previously suggested paraphrases, I will present successful ones which overcome all the difficulties to be discussed. A previously suggested paraphrase of (1) is:

(1’) Humble persons are virtuous.

However, as Armstrong indicates, the truth of (1) is compatible with there being humble persons who are not virtuous\textsuperscript{25), because

\textsuperscript{21)} Oliver (1996), p. 65
\textsuperscript{22)} Armstrong (1980), pp. 445-446
\textsuperscript{23)} Pap (1959), p. 334
\textsuperscript{24)} Jackson (1977), p. 427
\textsuperscript{25)} Armstrong (1980), pp. 445-446
serial killers could be humble but we do not want them to be considered as virtuous. The second problem is that the truth of (1)' is compatible with humility not being a virtue, because if the (1)' is the right translation of (1), then the following problem occurs due to the parallel of the structure of translation. Suppose it is true that tall persons are virtuous.

(1*)' Tall persons are virtuous.

It is exactly parallel to (1)'. If (1)' is the correct paraphrasing of (1), then the correct paraphrasing of (1*)' would be:

(1*) Tallness is a virtue.

But we do not believe (1*) to be true. The disparity of truth between (1*)' and (1*) and the parity of the translating structure of the four sentences demonstrate that (1)' cannot be the right paraphrase of (1).

One reason for the aforementioned problem is that humility is not a sufficient condition for being virtuous. However, it is true that humility contributes to a person being a more virtuous person. Therefore, the better paraphrase of (1) is:

(n1) Humble persons would be less virtuous if they were not humble.

Then we can deal with Armstrong’s first problem that humble
persons might not be virtuous, because a humble serial killer would be more virtuous than an arrogant serial killer with other conditions equal, even though the humble one cannot be considered to be virtuous.

If (n1) is the right translation of (1), then we have obtained a lead to deal with the second problem, since the right translation of (1*) should be:

(n1*)’ Tall persons would be less virtuous if they were not tall.

It is not equivalent to (1*)’, because (n1*)’ is false even though (1*)’ is true. That is because even though tall persons are virtuous, their being virtuous could be coincidental with their being tall. It would not be easy to find an inherent connection between being tall and being virtuous. So, we might be allowed to allocate consistent truth to the sentences. (1) and (n1) are both true, while (1*) and (n1*)’ are both false. Therefore, (n1) is the right translation of (1), which avoids commitment to the property.

Jackson\textsuperscript{26} indicates a similar problem of (2) “Red is a colour”. If it means (2)’ “Everything red is coloured”, then (2*) “Red is a shape” should be true, since (2*)’ “Everything red is shaped” is true. Jackson adds that it is not successful to solve this problem by resorting to operator ‘it is analytic’. For one cannot replace ‘is coloured’ by ‘is yellow or red or..’, a disjunction it is impossible to complete. However, if we use similar methods as (n1), the

\footnote{Jackson (1977), pp. 427-428}
better way to paraphrase (2) without difficulties is:

(n2) Red things would be differently coloured, if they were not red.

(3) “Red resembles pink more than it resembles blue” is a problem because it is true, while its candidate translation (3)’ “Anything red resembles anything pink more than anything blue” is not true. As Pap points out\(^{27}\) and Jackson supports, red balls could resemble blue balls more than they resemble pink elephants\(^{28}\). Jackson continues to argue at painful length why (3) cannot be successfully paraphrased. However, we need not paraphrase (3). The whole problem regarding (3) depends on the solid truth of (3). If (3) turns out to be false, then it will not cause Nominalists difficulties. To me, (3) seems to be false, for redness itself is not red, even though redness is a colour.

The reason Nominalists were worried about (3) is because if (3) is true, then they have to accept properties, \textit{something abstract}. The colours are either abstract or concrete. If colours are concrete then Nominalists would gladly accept them. If the colours are abstract entities, it is hard to imagine how they can have colours. They are colourless colours. If they are colourless then it does not make sense to say that they resemble each other or not, whatever natures of their \textit{instances} have or whether their \textit{instances} resemble each other or not.

\(^{27}\) Pap (1959), pp. 330-340
\(^{28}\) Jackson (1977), pp. 427-428
Then why do people firmly believe that red is similar to pink? Considering people’s disposition to make hasty generalizations, it is not a surprising phenomenon. Indeed, statistically speaking, it is true that red things resemble pink things more. In addition, people tend to extract abstract ideas from the statistical facts, as Berkeley said.29)

These three are all the problematic occurrences of abstract singular terms in the literature. So, we need to deal with the next kind of expression.

3. Property-quantification

Quine’s strategy for sentences that feature property-quantifiers is to take them as quantifying over not properties, but sets or open sentences. However, if we successfully paraphrase the sentences, the strategy is not needed. Paraphrasing these sentences is more hopeful than it seemed, though the task is not complete. So, it is too early to give up the strategy of paraphrasing. Armstrong(4-5)30, Putnam(6)31, and Russell(7)32 presented examples that are considered to be difficult to solve. The reasons of difficulties are not offered, leading my solutions to be simple as well.

(4) The dresses are of the same colour.
(5) He has the same virtues as his father.

29) Berkeley (1998), pp. 92-93
There are undiscovered fundamental physical properties.

Napoleon had all the qualities of a good general.

It is possible to paraphrase them as follows:

The dresses are similarly coloured.

He would be as virtuous as his father would be in any situations.

We haven’t fully discovered how physical things fundamentally resemble each other.

Napoleon was fully qualified as a good general.

To me, these newly suggested paraphrases seem to deliver correctly what are meant by the original sentences, avoiding any possible difficulties. However, I owe an explanation for the grammatical discrepancy between the original sentences and the paraphrased ones. For example, “humility is a virtue” is an indicative sentence, while “humble persons would be less virtuous if they were not humble” is a subjunctive conditional. My explanation is that the newly suggested grammatical forms deliver with greater precision what are meant by the more idiomatic ones at the cost of elegant simplicity. For example, when you say “seeing is believing”, you might not be claiming that seeing is actually identical with believing. If you insist your statement to be taken literally, then you are saying something false. However, if you explain that what was actually meant by the sentence was “if one sees something, then one is very likely to believe it”,
then we would accept what your paraphrase means. There, you achieved the truth by introducing a different grammatical form. And I want to believe that we are concerned here with the truth of sentences, not of apparent, ordinary grammatical forms which are no good indicators to the truth.

So far, we have taken it for granted that paraphrase is needed. Lewis, however, insists that there is no need for paraphrasing. His argument deserves a detailed examination.

IV. Objection to Paraphrase

1. Lewis’s Objection from a New Conception of Property

Lewis’s argument against the need for paraphrase depends on his conception of property. Lewis says, what serve as the semantic values of items within the sentences above are not universals, but properties as classes of actual and possible particulars. Then, as there are classes of red things, the property of being red plainly exists. Therefore, Nominalists are free to use terms such as ‘red’ without ontological burden.

Lewis’s claim that properties are better suited than universals as semantic values is based on the distinction between universals and properties. They are different in two principle ways, according to Lewis. First, properties and universals are different in the manner of their instantiation. “A universal is supposed to be wholly present wherever it is instantiated. It is a constituent part of each particular that has it. A property, by contrast, is spread around.
The property of being a donkey is partly present wherever there is a donkey.”\cite{Lewis1983} Second, universals and properties are different in their abundance. Universals are sparse, while properties are abundant. The reason for such difference stems from Lewis’s idea that properties are classes. The reason why a donkey is a member of the property of being a donkey, not the property’s being a part of the donkey, is because Lewis regards the property as a class, and the donkey as a member of it. The reason why properties are abundant, as opposed to universals, is because there are as many properties as there are classes of actual and possible particulars.

However, Lewis does not give enough grounds for this important premise: properties are identical with classes. It is implausible to consider properties as classes for many reasons.

First, infinitely many different properties seem to correspond to one identical class. The property of being round-squared, being triangular-squared, and being faster-than-light-and-slower-than-light, etc are identical with the empty class, because no possible world could contain such things as a round-squared box. However, it is unconvincing that being round-squared and being triangular-squared are the same property, just because they correspond to the one identical class. If they are different properties then they have to be matched with different classes. Lewis might construct another conception of property to

\cite{Lewis1983} Lewis (1983), pp. 344-345. According to this position, classes have spatio-temporal location, as classes are partly present where their members are. This might cause tension with the ordinary conception that the classes are abstract objects.
individuate these properties, using higher-order relation and an \textit{existing} conception of property, as he did to individuate triangularity and trilaterality. Strictly speaking, however, the newly-structured one is different from the original one.\textsuperscript{34) If his conceptions of property divide what we regard as one, then we cannot be satisfied with his conceptions.

Second, Lewis’s properties and relations are not sufficient to serve as semantic values, on the utility of which Lewis’s conception is based. Take “the average man has 2.4 children” for example. What serves as the semantic value of the two-place predicate ‘has’ is a \textit{relation}. A relation is a set of ordered pairs, according to Lewis’s understanding.\textsuperscript{35) What then would figure in the ordered pairs in this case? The average man and 2.4 children would figure, which do not exist. Lewis had better paraphrase the sentence, which undermines the motivation to accept his properties.

All these reasons demonstrate that Lewis’s properties are inconsistent with classes, and are not useful enough to accept them.

\textbf{2. Problems Remaining for All}

Still, there remain some problems for all, including Lewis, to solve. Lewis added two more sentences to the previous sentences for Nominalists to paraphrase. They are:

\textsuperscript{34) Lewis (1986), p. 55 \hfill 35) Lewis (1986), p. 52}
(8) Grueness does not make for resemblance among all its instances.
(9) What is common to all who suffer pain is being in some or another state which occupies the pain role, presumably not the same state in all cases.

What needs to be quantified over here are “grueness” and “what is common”. Those who want to regard these sentences as true have two choices. First, one can accept the existence of what are quantified over. Then one needs to explain the natures of these entities. Second, if one wants to deny those entities, then one should present successful paraphrases. The Realists such as Armstrong, who considers universals as sparse, would want to choose the second option, as well as Nominalists. Lewis, if he wants to insist that entities such as grueness exist, then he needs to provide an explanation about their natures. Simply saying “grueness is a class of grue things” is not enough for reasons discussed above.

Nominalists can provide successful paraphrases, obviating Lewis’s suggestion to abandon paraphrase in favour of accepting properties as classes. They can be successfully paraphrased into:

(8’) If grue things resemble each other, then it is not because they are grue.
(9’) All who suffer pain are in some or another state which occupies the pain role, presumably not the same state in all cases.
(8)’ and (9)’ are committed to particulars. (9)’ is committed to people and some state. The states are mental, and it is absurd to deny that each person’s mental state exists. They are not abstract, as they have spatio-temporal location. Even though it is common that those who suffer pain are in a similar state, it does not press us to admit a corresponding abstract entity. Therefore, accepting (9)’ is no burden to Nominalists, until someone proves the need to postulate an abstract entity to admit (9)’.

V. Conclusion

Paraphrase is the necessary business for Nominalists, contrary to Lewis’s belief. Fortunately, the business is more hopeful than it has been regarded. Furthermore, the One Over Many problem does not convince us to accept the existence of properties. All these points indicate the direction for Nominalists: focus on paraphrase to maintain Nominalists’ position.
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__________(forthcoming) “Postscript to ‘’Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’?””, Metaphysics, pp. 20-30


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이 논문은 콰인의 존재론적 개입 기준이 유명론자에게 야기하는 문제에 관한 것이다. "존재한다는 것은 변량의 값이 되는 것이다"는 것이 콰인의 분명한 존재론적 개입 기준이다. 이 기준에 의하면, 우리가 어떤 문장을 참이라고 여길 경우, 그 문장이 참이 되기 위해서 존재해야 하는 것들의 존재에 우리가 개입하게 된다. 그런데 이 기준은 유명론자에게 문제를 야기한다. "겸손은 미덕이다"라는 것을 참이라고 받아들이고 싶은 유명론자는, 겸손이라는 속성의 존재를 받아들이어야 한다는 것이다. 그러나 유명론자는 "겸손은 미덕이다"라는 말이 의미하는 것은 받아들이고 싶지만, 겸손과 같은 속성의 존재를 받아들이고 싶어하는 것이다. 결국 유명론자는, 상식을 부정하든지, 속성의 존재를 받아들이든지 선택해야 하는 달레마에 처해있는 것이다. 이러한 난국을 빠져나갈 수 있는 방법은, 속성에 대한 존재론적 개입을 피하면서도 원래 문장과 같은 뜻을 가지는 패러프레이즈를 제시하는 것이다. 그러나, 올바른 패러프레이즈를 제시하는 것은 항상 어려운 일이었다. 이와 같은 문장들에 대해서 패러프레이즈를 제시하려는 노력이 있었지만, 여러 어려움 때문에 모두 실패하고 말았다. 이 논문에서는, 기존의 문제점들을 모두 극복하는 성공적인 패러프레이즈가 제시될 것이다. 하지만 그 전에 콰인의 기준에 관한 몇몇 주제들이 더 명확히 정리될 필요가 있다. 패러프레이즈가 아예 필요하지 않다는 루이스의 비판 역시 또한 다뤄질 것이다.

주요어: 존재론적 개입, 속성, 유명론자, 패러프레이즈, 루이스