논리학회 회원 여러분들께,
한국논리학회에서는 2016년 정기 여름 발표회를 아래와 같이 가지고자 합니다. 이번 발표회에서는 다섯 개의 발표를 바탕으로 논의의 시간을 가지고자 합니다. 무더운 여름 날씨에 여러 일정들로 바쁘시겠지만 많은 회원님들의 관심과 참여를 바랍니다.
한국논리학회 배상.
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일시: 2016년 7월 19일 화요일 오후 1:00 – 6:00
장소: 동덕여자대학교 약학관 110호 (정문에서 볼 때 가장 왼쪽 첫번째 건물)
찾아오시는 방법: 지하철 6호선 월곡역/동덕여대역에서 하차, 2번/3번 출구에서 500m 지점. (차를 가져오실 경우 동덕여대에서의 주차는 무료입니다. )
일정
등록 (1:00 - 1:20)
개회 인사 (1:20 - 1:30): 박준용 회장
1부
발표 1 (1:30-2:20): 변수(variables)와 관련된 프레게의 논의에 대한 고찰
발표: 이계식 (한경대)
논평: 한대석 (충남대)
초록: 프레게의 Begriffsschrift는 변수(variables)의 역할과 의미에 대한 논의로 시작한다. 후반부 양화사에 대한 부분에서도 다시 한 번 변수의 역할을 논한다. 이번 발표에서 프레게의 변수에 대한 논의와 현대 컴퓨터 수학에서의 변수에 대한 논의 사이에 어떤 연관성이 있는가를 살펴본다. 또한 프레게의 고민이 현대 컴퓨터 수학의 발전에 끼친 영향을 확인한다.
발표 2 (2:20-3:10): Epistemic Optimism: Credences and Accuracy
발표: 박일호 (전북대)
논평: 김남중 (경상대)
초록: This paper is intended to formulate and justify some versions of epistemic optimism. In particular, I will formulate what will be called Credence-based Optimism and Accuracy-based Optimism, and practically justify them using diachronic Dutch book arguments. This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is devoted to formulating and justifying what I will call Credence-based Optimism. In Section 3, I point out a difficulty of such optimism and attempt to formulate and justify another kind of epistemic optimism, Accuracy-based Optimism. Lastly, I will compare these kinds of optimism with other epistemic norms like (General) Reflection in Section 4. In doing so, we can ascertain the theoretical status of the epistemic optimism in question.
발표 3 (3:10-4:00): Horwich on the Value of Truth
발표: 이병덕 (성균관대)
논평: 김동현 (교통대)
초록: Paul Horwich argues that the concept of truth is not constitutively normative. Nonetheless, he explains the alleged value of true belief by claiming that truth for its own sake is morally valuable. The purpose of this paper is to show that his explanation about the value of truth is implausible. For this purpose, in particular, I argue for the following claims. Truth is too thin a notion to be constituted by any substantial norm, and so there is no substantial norm of truth independent of the norms of justification. Thus, we ought to pursue our epistemic goal by following the norms of justification. In addition, epistemic values are relative to our epistemic goal, whereas moral values are relative to our moral goal. Hence, the alleged value of true belief has no direct bearing on our moral goal. Instead, the alleged value of true belief should be understood in terms of the epistemic value of justified belief.
휴식 (4:00 - 4:20)
2부
발표 4 (4:20-5:10): Locality, independence, and origin essentialism
발표: 이충형 (포항공대) / 이병욱 (토론토대)
논평: 권홍우 (연세대)
초록: Rohrbaugh and deRosset (2004; 2006) present a new argument for origin essentialism, the view that a material object could not have had an origin different from its actual origin. We argue that their argument fails for two reasons. First, its main premise that preventing the production of a material object must make local differences (the locality of prevention thesis) is false because identity and origin are not governed by locality. Second, the argument is self-refuting because another premise (the separability thesis) conflicts with its conclusion, i.e., origin essentialism.
발표 5 (5:10-6:00): The Impossibility of Liberal Rights in a Diversified World
발표: 정훈 (아리조나대)
논평: 김현섭 (서울대)
초록: One purpose of individual rights is to adjudicate social conflict in a way that renders a determinate social choice. However, many social conflicts arise not because people disagree
about who has rights over what, but rather because people disagree about the fundamental natures of the social alternatives themselves. (e.g. abortion) This paper considers whether a liberal social choice that respects each individual’s rights is possible in a diversified world where different individuals hold incompatible views on social ontology.
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