2019년 1월 25일(금요일)에 있을 한국논리학회 정기 발표회를 안내 드립니다.
이번 발표회에서는 네 분의 선생님을 모시고 발표와 토론을 진행하고자 합니다.
‘성균관대 철학과 인문교육연구소’ 주최로 열리는 이번 학회에, 회원 여러분의 많은 관심과 참여 부탁드립니다.
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일시: 2019년 1월 25일 금요일
장소: 성균관대 명륜캠퍼스 호암관 50412호
주최: 성균관 대학교 철학과 인문교육연구소
1:00-1:20: 등록
1:20-1:30: 개회사 (논리학회 회장 김신(외대) / 성균관대 이병덕)
1부: 1:30-3:40: 사회(이진희/아주대)
1:30-2:30: 발표1(최승락/고려대): The Proof-Theoretic Criterion for Paradoxicality and
Ekman-Type Reductions
2:30-2:40 휴식
2:40-3:40: 발표2(정재민/원광대): A 'Permissivist' Worry about Leitgeb and Pettigrew's Argument for Bayesianism
3:40-3:50 휴식
2부: 3:50-6:00: 사회(김명석/국민대)
3:50-4:50: 발표3(이계식/한경대): 논리를 누구에게 어떻게 가르칠 것인가?
4:50-5:00 휴식
5:00-6:00: 발표4(이병덕/성균관대): A Coherentist Justification of Induction
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초록
최승락: The Proof-Theoretic Criterion for Paradoxicality and Ekman-Type Reductions
초록: : Neil Tennant(1982, 1995) proposes an idea of avoiding paradoxes by restricting ourselves to a normal derivation. A derivation formalized in natural deduction can be in normal form through a certain reduction procedure. Tennant(1982) has given examples that a reduction process of paradoxical derivations ends up in a non-terminating reduction sequence. He proposes a proof-theoretic criterion for paradoxicality that a genuine paradox is a derivation of an unacceptable conclusion which is involved in a certain form of id est inferences and generates a non-terminating reduction sequence.
Schroeder-Heister and Tranchini(2017) argue that Tennant’s criterion for paradoxicality needs to be refined by suggesting a counterexample, called Ekman’s paradox. Not only Tennant, but Schroeder-Heister and Tranchini have offered solutions to the problem. The purpose of the present paper is to evaluate whether their solutions are successful. First, we argue that the solution of Tennant(2016, 2017) that the choice of generalized elimination rules can block the derivation of an absurdity from Ekman’s paradox is not successful. The real issue is not a choice of the form of elimination rules but of the set of proper reduction procedures. Second, it will be discussed that Schroeder-Heister and Tranchini’s Triviality test may not restrict all Ekman-type reduction process because it works relative to a given system.
For our solution to Ekman’s paradox, we shall propose Translation test with the minimum requirements that a legitimate reduction procedure must neither (T1) eliminate any necessary premise nor (T2) introduce any unnecessary detour. Consequently, Translation test can restrict the use of the Ekman-type reduction processes.
정재민: A 'Permissivist' Worry about Leitgeb and Pettigrew's Argument for Bayesianism
초록: Probabilism says that a doxastic state should be probabilistically coherent. Conditionalization says that an agent should update her doxastic state by conditionalizing on new evidence that she learns with certainty. Leitgeb and Pettigrew argue that Probabilism and Conditionalization are justified by appealing to accuracy. However, in this paper, I show that, given a plausible view on permissive epistemic rationality, their arguments are unsound.
이계식: 논리를 누구에게 어떻게 가르칠 것인가?
초록: 논리가 중요하며 논리적 사고가 다양하게 활용될 수 있다는 말은 상식이다. 하지만 논리교육의 중요성은 논리의 제대로 인정받지 못하고 있다. 중, 고등학교 및 대학교에서 논리 관련 수업이 거의 없다는 단편적인 사실이 이를 반증한다. 예를 들어, 수리논리의 영향이 큰 수학 및 컴퓨터 프로그래밍 관련 학과에서 제대로된 수리논리 기초를 가르치는 대학은 국내에 사실상 단 한 곳밖에 없다. 이에 반해 수학 및 프로그래밍 관련 학생 및 연구자들의 수리논리에 대한 요구는 매우 높다. 이러한 상황을 변화시키기 위해 국내 논리교육의 방향을 한 번 모색했으면 하는 바램이 있다. 수학과 수리논리를 전공하였고 다년간의 프로그래밍 교육을 담당한 연구자 입장에서 이 문제에 대해 함께 논의하는 시간을 갖고자 한다.
이병덕: A Coherentist Justification of Induction
초록: In this paper I offer a coherentist justification of induction along the lines of a Sellarsian coherence theory. On this coherence theory, roughly, a proposition (or a rule of inference) is justified if we can meet all objections raised against it in our social practice of demanding justification and responding to such demands. On the basis of this theory of justification, I argue that we are justified in accepting the principle of induction in part because we have no alternative but to accept the principle of induction in order to pursue our epistemic goal. In addition, my coherentist view explains which inductive inferences it is rational to accept. Furthermore, my coherentist view also explains why there is no numerical probability x such that if the numerical probability of ‘p’ is greater than or equal to x, then we are justified in accepting that p.
